DVOŘÁKOVÁ DANIELA: Lobbying in the European Union and the Czech Republic. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2013, LXI, No. 7, pp. 2099-2104 Transparent lobbying is a natural and desirable part of the functioning of each democratic state. The paper analyzes the specifi c ways, perception and regulation of lobbying in the European Union and the Czech Republic. In the European Union it focuses mainly on two institutions which are under pressure of the lobbyists, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Furthermore, paper presents the situation in the perception and regulation of lobbying in the Czech Republic, and clarifi es several unsucessful attempts to regulate lobbying. In conclusion paper compares specifi c lobbying environment and regulation in the European Union and the Czech Republic and formulates recommendations for the Czech lobbying practices.
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The article freely follows the article Lobbying in the European Union: Regulation and Public Secor Economics Perspective.
1 A er introduction of the lobbying in the European Union it focuses on the comparison with the regulation process and perception of the lobbying in the Czech Republic.
Transparent lobbying is a natural and desirable part of the functioning of democratic political system. Lobbying has become an inseparable companion of the decision-making process and fi rms but also other social actors (non-governmental organizations, individuals, private and civil sector) are forced to refl ect this fact, if they want to promote their interests eff ectively and if they want to avoid regulation that would harm their interests. Legal regulation helps cultivate lobbying activity and contributes to the formation of better quality and more transparent decision-making. Transparency in decision-making process further leads to greater public confi dence in politics.
Lobbying is becoming hotly contested as well legitimate way to aff ect legislation. Social, political and legal science and part of the institutional economists consider lobbying as very positive, welcome and as a legitimate part of any democratic system. The decision-makers or legislators simply do not have all information which is needed to make a well-balanced decision or to approve a bill with regards to all interest groups which will be aff ected. The interest groups serve as an information providers. Similar position is hold by the European institutions, notably by the European Commission.
On the contrary, among mainstream economists there is a widespread belief, that lobbying is something negative in economic process. Economists speak about the forced demand, which causes allocative ineffi ciency. This allocative ineffi ciency grows from the asymmetry of information between lobbyist and legislator. Lobbyists can provide information resulting in higher public spending on specifi c activities of the public sector, which bring only benefi ts for the corporation itself. The fi nal product, and the price per unit of production is so unreasonably increased.
The price for this overproduction also expresses the extent of social costs for the public. In addition to the overproduction, it is also possible to speak about parallel eff ects in the form of extra quality public goods or unsolicited innovation for voters.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
The main materials and methods used are literature and electronic data research on the European and Czech lobbying and qualitative analysis of these data, resources, as well legal norms relating to lobbying. The contribution uses theoretical politological, legal and institucional economics approaches. The contribution does not address the negative eff ects of lobbying on the social optimum. It introduces specifi c ways and regulation of lobbying in the European Union and the Czech Republic. It performes and formulates recommendations on the basis of qualitative document analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 1 Lobbying in the European Union
The real modern lobbying in the EU is associated with the 80s of the 20th century.
3 This is mainly due to the importance of the Single European Act, which involved the European Parliament in the decisionmaking process, accelerated completion of the single market and restored the qualifi ed majority voting in the EU Council. This led to the strengthening of the supranational elements in the European Union. Lobbying could therefore be targeted directly at the supranational level and was not limited by the infl uence of the Council's Representatives, who disposed of the veto. The Single European Act and the following primary European treaties opened a new space for the interest groups, which weren't limited by the national arena anymore. The quantity of lobbying and its study expands proportionally with closer European integration, along with higher level of transferring powers to Brussel. Gradually Brussels became the largest lobbying centre in Europe.
The European institutions give a warm welcome to lobbyists. Essential to the European lobbying is to be known, transparent, visible, to have worked out analyses, to be fl exible and able to form targeted coalition and to make compelling arguments. Lobbying takes place in public and is well visible.
On the contrary in the Czech Republic lobbying is consider as something negative what happens rather in the background and many entrepreneurs even do not want to talk about they are lobbying for something.
In the European Union it is about a public lobbying where you need to make your voice heard as much as possible and not about a secret conspiratorial meetings and discussions behind closed doors related to the transfer of suitcases full of money as many people in the Czech Republic imagine. Lobbyists in the EU need to be known and have a good name. Register of lobbyists is therefore consider rather as the promotion and demonstration of reliability and quality. Lobbyists in Brussels simply must have instead of suitcase of money suitcase of arguments.
Lobbying in the European Commission
The European Commission is the most eff ective and therefore the most important access point for the organized interests. This is mainly because the Commission's monopoly of the legislative initiative, which requires the activity of the European Commission in many areas. The European Commission off ers an opportunity to infl uence the legislative proposal from the very beginning. It is also attractive because the interests are highly welcome and appreciate by the Commission. Interests serve as an information source from a particular sector. 4 The Commission has long been the centre of the European lobbying with but a minimal regulation. In 1999, as the Preseident Jacques Santer's aff air broke out, the Commission was accused of bad management of fi nancial funds and Jacques Santer was forced to resign. The register should serve as a test for the preparation of an unifi ed and compulsory register of lobbyists, which should cover all interest groups in the Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the future. The register is divided into three main categories: professional consultants and law fi rms, representatives of industry and business and nonprofi t organizations and think tanks. The requirements on disclosure of information distinguish among these categories. The most stringent requirements (and therefore also the lobbyists in this group are not willling to register) are in the fi rst group. Law fi rms and professional consultants must disclose how much money they have received (rounded to € 50,000) from their individual clients to promote their interests in the European institutions.
5 Lobbyists who want to be enrolled in the registry must also fulfi ll one more condition: undertake to comply with the rules of the Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives, which the European Commission approved on the 28th May 2008.
The Transparency Initiative is an attempt to increase the transparency of lobbying, however the eff ective tools targeting the gray zone and inappropriate practices have not been established yet and the register has been criticized for failing to improve transparency. 6 Meanwhile the Commission continues to rely on the principle of self-regulation on the part of interest groups.
Lobbying in the European Parliament
Similar to Commission's offi cials, Members of the European Parliament also need professional information on the consultated legislation, preferably from more competent sources in order to take a position supported by expert evidence. Lobbyists can penetrate into the Parliament by several channels -through its administration, political groups, Parliamentary Committees or through the intergroups. The interest groups focus mainly on the political parties and Committeess, which represent the core of the Parliamentary activities. In principle, only the largest political groups have the ability to infl uence the legislation -the European People's Party-European Democrats and the Party of Socialists and Democrats. Organized interests mainly focus on leadership and secretariats of these two groups.
The starting moment of the lobbying in the European Parliament is considered to be the Committee's decision about who will be tasked to report about the dra (a person called rapporteur). The rapporteur studies and analyzes the dra and prepares a report about this dra , which would encompass the positions of the other Members of the Committee and which would be the most acceptable. The rapporteur accompanies the report on the whole way trough the European Parliament. Although the plenary session is the main decisionmaking body and the Parliament has the last word on the legislation, majority of the Parliament legislative activities takes place in specialized Committees. The Committees' hearings are usually public, representatives of the interest groups thus have an access to their hearings. Another signifi cant fact is that in the Committee an amendment to legislation can be made by any Member of the Parliament, whilst in the plenary session much stricter conditions are set. Therefore MEPs during plenary sessions have only very limited opportunity to infl uence the present legislative dra .
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Other channels, which might be used by lobbyists, are the administrative structures of the ParliamentSecretariat, the Bureau, the Conference of Presidents and the College of Quaestors. At the time of the arrival of a new legislative proposal, Conference of Presidents is convened. There the presidents of the Committees decide to which Committee the proposal will be assigned. College of Quaestors is then charged with fi nancial and administrative matters aff ecting members. 8 The Secretary General of the EP secretariat decides which experts will be invited to the plenary session of the EP or to the Committees hearings to express their opinions.
Another chanel where the lobby groups might assert their interest are intergroups. The intergroups are characterized as discussion clubs of deputies with experts and lobbyists. The meetings are held on an informal basis and don't represent the Parliament's opinion. Intergroups are subject to internal rules adopted by the Conference of Presidents on 16 December 1999 (last updated on 14 February 2008), which set out the conditions under which intergroups may be established at the beginning of each parliamentary term and their operating rules.
9 Chairs of intergroups are required to declare any support they receive in cash or kind, according to the same criteria, which are applicable to Members and individuals. The declarations must be updated every year and are fi lled in a public register held by the Quaestors.
Regulation of lobbying in the European
Parliament European Parliament became during the '80s the target of a growing number of lobbyists, thus regulation was required and later in 1995 accomplished by the insertion of new paragraphs to Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure. The main document regulating lobbying in the European Parliament is the Article 9 in the Rules of Procedure, which is further developed in Annex IX. Rules for special interest groups determine organizational issues like licensing, validity or removal of entry cards to the Parliament as well as the crucial Code of Conduct, which sets out the rules that accredited lobbyists must observe. The applicants for admission to the European Parliament have to register, pay an annual fee and complete statement of its activities. All this must be done once every year. Signing in the register entitles the person to receive an entry pass to the European Parliament. For application of the rules and issuing passports are responsible the Quaestors. Lobbyists are also required to provide an overview of benefi ts, gi s and services provided to MEPs, offi cials or assistants of Members, which exceed the value of 100 euros.
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In December 2012 a new Code of conduct for MEPs was endorsed. The Code sets out rules and principles which MEPs will need to follow in their contacts with outside interests, so as to avoid confl ict of interests. It is the the fi rst-ever code of conduct for MEPs and it is considered as a strong shield against unethical behaviour. The Code's guiding principle is transparency. MEPs will have to provide clear declarations of their paid activities outside the Parliament and their remuneration, as well as of any other functions which might constitute a confl ict of interest. The Code also contains an explicit ban on receiving payments or other rewards in exchange for infl uencing parliamentary decisions. There are clear rules on the acceptance of gi s and on the position of former MEPs working as lobbyists.
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Lobbying in the Czech Republic
The regulation of lobbying in the Czech Republic is relatively new topic. Public opinion consider lobbying as something negative which is o en associated with corruption and bribery.
12 The need to regulate lobbying is related to this serious problem. According to the Corruption Perception Index, which annually assesses 176 countries, the Czech Republic places for many years around 54th position, which is the same result as states like Latvia, Malaysia and Turkey.
13 Transparency International has consistently emphasized the poorly functioning government, poor functioning of political parties and uneff ective anti-corruption policy. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 -100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries included in the index. The least corrupt countries in the world include constantly Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. At the other end of the scale end Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia. Available on the website: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. 14 ŠPOK, R., WEISS, T., KŘÍŽ, J., Regulation of Lobbying in the Czech Republic. History, Debate and Perspective, Available on the website http://www.europeum.org/en/freedom-security-justice/132-analyses-articles-comments/1736-regulation-of-lobbying-in-the-czech-republic-history-debate-and-perspective.
The current situation regarding regulation of lobbying
and lobbied persons (from 5,000 CZK for missing a deadline for reporting to 100,000 CZK for some more serious insuffi ciencies). The proposal was rejected by the right-wing deputies and returned for revision. The revised proposal was submitted on the 9th December 2009 by the social democrats Mr. Bohuslav Sobotka and Mr. Jeroným Tejc, the Greens' deputies Ondřej Liška and Věra Jakoubková and by the Communists' deputy Paul Kováčik. This proposal was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, however it was rejected on the 23th June 2010 in the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies Deputies didn't revote due to the election in Mai 2010.
As far as support a lobbying act, the Czech political scene remains clearly divided on the critical right and le (which was joined by Greens), which supports the proposal. Critics claime that such a complex proposal should be worked out by the government itself rather than by opposition and there is also a traditional dispute over the defi nition of lobbyists and setting penalties. Furthermore, the right-wing criticism focuses on the register of lobbyists which should not be compulsory but voluntary and the overall regulation should be based on self-regulation.
On the 5th January 2011, the Government adopted the Strategy of the Czech government in the fi ght against corruption for the years 2011 and 2012, prepared On the 14th July 2011 the Respekt Institute organised in cooperation with the deputy Lenka Andrýsová an expert meeting with nongovernmental organizations and think tanks dealing with anti-corruption measures. The result of this wide discussion was to create a comprehensive legislation on lobbying and to make appeals on government to the rapid work on lobbying act.
At present, the issue of lobbying is led by the vice-chair woman and President of the Legislative Council and Chairman of the Government Committee for the coordination of the fi ght against corruption, Mrs. Carolina Peake. A er almost a year of preparation and experts' opinions, a er processing and analysis of lobbying, however, in January 2013, Mrs. Carolina Peake and government didn't recommended that an lobbying act would be passed because of number of contradictions and proposed to replace it with other measures.
15 Strategy of the Czech government in the fi ght against corruption, available on the website: http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ boj-proti-korupci-strategievlady-v-boji-proti-korupci.aspx.
CONCLUSION
The paper deals with the analysis of the specifi c ways of lobbying and its regulation in the European Commission, the European Parliament and in the Czech Republic. Lobbyists are perceived in the European institutions as the providers of professional information and they present a bridge between civil society, the public and the Brussels institutions. MEPs and EC offi cials do not have all information which is needed to make a well-balanced decision or approve a bill with regards to all interest groups which will be aff ected and they miss the feedback from the civil society. The interest groups and lobbyists are therefore warm welcome in the institutions. On the contrary in the Czech Republic lobbying is perceived highly negatively, as something that is associated with non-transparent and corruptive practices. Despite negative perceptions, high Corruption Perception Index and despite the conclusions of the experts tables and several attempts to regulate lobbying there is still no legal act on lobbying, even not a Code of conduct for the deputies. The European Commission relies rather on the principle of the self-regulation, however increasing attempts were undertook since 2005 to strengthen the transparency in the decision-making process.
In June 2008, a voluntary register of lobbyists was launched. There are diff erent opinions about its functioning. Lobbyists consider it as a success, non-governmental organizations and some experts complain about the low quality of the information in the registry and ambiguity of rules. Due to the high corruption rate and negative perception of lobbying in the Czech Republic an lobbying act would be highly appropriate, however suffi cient political support is missing. The possible regulation could use the model of the European Parliament, as well some elements of the attitudes from the European Commission -notably to facilitate the access of the non-governmental organizations and civil society actors to the Parliament to take into consideration their opinions. In Brussels, a key to succesfull lobbying is to be well visible, known and transparent. Lobbing is discussed on daily routine. In Czech Republic lobbying is done more in the background, and many entrepreneurs even do not want to admit that they are lobbying.
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